黄河黑山峡大柳树水利枢纽工程功能分析

为了抢抓国家当前高度重视生态文明建设,加强中西部地区重大调水工程建设的历史机遇,加快黄河黑山峡河段开发,梳理分析了黄河黑山峡大柳树水利枢纽工程在黄河调水调沙、水资源配置、区域建设发展等方面的功能作用,分析了相关省区的发展作用并提出损益处理建议,以求多方共赢,共同呼吁国家加快黄河大柳树水利枢纽工程立项建设。     

Has the “CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate leaders

We introduce a new explanation for one of the most pronounced phenomena on the American business landscape in recent decades: a dramatic increase in attributions of CEO significance. Specifically, we test the possibility that America's CEOs became seen as increasingly significant because they were, in fact, increasingly significant. Employing variance partitioning methodologies on data spanning 60 years and more than 18,000 firm‐years, we find that the proportion of variance in performance explained by individual CEOs, or “the CEO effect,” increased substantially over the decades of study. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this finding. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

澜湄流域跨境航运的多层次网络治理机制

在"一带一路"倡议大背景下,澜湄合作机制将"互联互通"纳入五大优先合作方向,对澜沧江-湄公河流域的跨境航运治理提出了新要求。随着全球化、信息化和区域一体化的发展,流域内的单一科层治理、市场治理传统模式频现失灵,网络化提供了不同的视角与方法。兼具"圈层"和"网络"双重结构特征的多层次网络治理结构,从"政府-市场-社会"3个层面通过科层、市场、网络治理方式共同发力,借鉴莱茵河的成功治理经验,给予涉水企业、民众、NGO、智库、媒体、科研机构等非政府主体更多治理权限,并结合澜湄流域实际情况提出多层次网络治理机制体系建议,以求改善澜湄跨境航运合作困境。     

基于GIS的皖江流域耕地地力评价研究

[目的]为了整体掌握皖江流域耕地地力水平、特征和土壤肥力状况等,充分利用耕地资源,提升皖江流域的耕地质量。[方法]文章基于农业部耕地资源管理信息系统软件,分别构建了皖江流域平原区和皖江流域山地丘陵区的评价指标体系,并通过现在较为成熟的特尔菲法、层次分析法、模糊数学评价等方法相结合,开展皖江流域耕地地力评价。[结果]皖江流域平原区耕地划分为9个等级, 1～9等地耕地面积所占比例分别为8.7%,18.4%,22.5%,22.7%,13.5%,17.2%,2.8%,2.9%和1.3%,其中2等地、3等地以及4等地分布区域较广,所占面积较大;皖江流域山地丘陵区耕地划分为9个等级, 1～9等地耕地面积所占比例分别为2.2%,8.6%,14.2%,26.0%,21.3%,10.6%,9.0%,5.0%和3.2%,该区域主要有3等地、4等地、5等地分布。[结论]该评价结果对皖江流域耕地资源的科学管理和可持续利用以及农业现代化发展具有非常重要的意义。     

长江经济带生态保护效率与科技服务业发展效率时空关联分析

建立超效率DEA模型并运用视窗分析测算2010-2017年长江经济带11个省市生态保护效率与科技服务业发展效率，通过空间计量模型分析后者对前者的影响。结果表明：科研技术服务业效率对当地及周边地区的生态保护效率具有正向影响；科技资本服务业效率对当地生态保护效率具有正向影响，但对其周边地区有抑制效应；科技宣传服务业未对生态保护效率产生显著影响。据此，提出长江经济带通过提高科技服务业效率改进生态保护效率的对策。     

学者型CEO更加自律吗?——学术经历对高管在职消费的影响

本文选取2010—2016年中国沪深A股上市公司样本,实证检验CEO学术经历对高管在职消费行为的影响。研究发现,学术经历有助于CEO强化道德自觉、增强道德自律,形成内在的自我约束与监督机制,进而抑制了其所在企业的高管在职消费活动。当CEO拥有高层次学术经历或来自内部晋升时,CEO学术经历对高管在职消费的抑制效应更为显著。该结论在采用双重差分模型、Heckman两阶段模型控制潜在的内生性问题及其他稳健性检验之后仍然成立。进一步研究表明,在自由现金流较多、董事会规模较大或独立性较低、外部审计监督较弱以及产品市场竞争程度较低等公司内外部治理环境较差的情景下,学者型CEO的自律品质所能发挥的治理作用更大,对高管在职消费的抑制效应也更为明显。此外,在党的十八大之后,随着“八项规定”等多项高压反腐政策的出台,政策效应在国有企业高管在职消费的治理中发挥着主导性作用,CEO学术经历对国有企业高管在职消费的抑制效应有所下降。本文为高管学术经历的治理效应假说提供了证据支持,对于上市公司规范和治理高管在职消费行为、选聘合适的高管人才具有重要的借鉴意义。     

金沙江中游水电站工程水土保持中存在的问题及对策

本文阐述了金沙江中游水电站建设中水土保持工作的重要性,分析了该区域电站水土保持工作中存在的问题,提出了解决问题的对策措施。     

浅谈沈阳浑河景观区域的建设与管理

以沈阳浑河景观区域为研究对象,以浑河景观区域园林绿化及基础设施建设管理实地调查情况为基础,对浑河景观区域建设与管理现状进行了论述,并对比国内外其他内陆河建设与管理发展情况,为浑河景观区域建设与管理提供建设性建议。     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moving out or living on a mound? Jointly planning a Dutch flood adaptation project

All over the world spatial flood risk management policies are on the rise. This paper analyses the planning process for the Overdiepse polder, a so-called “Room for the River” project in the Netherlands. After high water in the 1990s, the Dutch government changed its flood risk management policy. While before 2000 it leaned heavily on dikes to separate water from land, after that year spatial measures to “let the water flow” were introduced. This required the integration of two formerly separated policy domains: flood risk management and land use planning. In the densely populated and economically highly developed Netherlands, returning space to the river unavoidably impacts on the lives and livelihoods of those who live and work along the rivers. Therefore, such spatial measures to decrease flood risk have to be negotiated with various stakeholders. The planning process towards making the Overdiepse polder suitable for temporary water storage deserves more in-depth analysis. We describe and analyze the development of relationships between key actors in the planning process, with a focus on planning practices rather than on assumptions about the existence of certain types and qualities of relationships. We conclude, among others, that citizen involvement can, under specific socio-political and institutional conditions, build trust among stakeholders and increase local legitimacy for interventions by government agencies. However, it should not be idealized as “self-governance” or assumed to be part of a unidirectional change in water interventions towards new relationships between actors.